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I. INTRODUCTION
From its predecessors dating back to 1913 to the current version,
the California Talent Agencies Act of 1978 (“TAA” or “the Act”)
has aimed to protect artists from talent agents who would take advantage of them.1 The Act originally prohibited agents from “sending artists to ‘house[s] of ill fame’ or saloons, or allowing ‘persons
of bad character’ to frequent their establishments.”2 By requiring
talent agents to have a license, “the Act establishes detailed requirements for how the licensed talent agencies conduct their business,
including a code of conduct, submission of contracts and fee schedules to the state, maintenance of a client trust account, posting of a
bond, and prohibitions against discrimination, kickbacks, and certain
conflicts of interest.”3
* J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center (2010); B.A., Mass Communications, Bloomsburg University (2000).
1. Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 746 (Cal. 2008).
2. Id. (discussing the purposes of the Act).
3. Id. at 747.
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However, despite this well-intentioned beginning, the Act no
longer binds itself to business realities.4 Instead, the Act turns a
blind eye to the “catch-22” of new artists and their personal managers: without enough success, talent agents are not interested in the
artists, but without a talent agent, there is no legal way for the new
artist to procure the required employment to find such success.5 Personal managers frequently face the difficult decision of violating the
Act by procuring employment, which then puts their contract in
jeopardy because of the illegal procurement.6 Without procurement
in the first place though, there will be no success, nor need for a talent agent.7
The California courts’ allowance of a “gotcha” by artists who
want to disavow an otherwise valid contract drives poor behavior
and does not protect the personal managers who work so diligently
to help the artists attain a level of success.8 If the Act was indeed
created to protect artists, and the procurement of employment protects artists’ interests, then personal managers should be protected
from artists disavowing contracts.9 Further, the Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi court did not go far enough in its guidance on
severability.10 In that case, the court failed to bring the Act back to a

4. Erick Flores, Note, “That’s a Wrap! (Or Is It?)”: The Unanswered Question
of Severability Under California’s Talent Agencies Act After Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi, 97 GEO. L.J. 1333, 1338 (2009).
5. Id. at 1335–36; Gary A. Greenberg, Note, The Plight of the Personal Manager in California: A Legislative Solution, 6 HASTINGS J. COMM. & ENT. L. 837,
839–40 (1984).
6. Flores, supra note 4, at 1341–42; see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 839–40
(noting personal managers either must obtain a license or operate in violation of
the statute).
7. See Flores, supra note 4, at 1342.
8. Id. at 1343; see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 857 (noting the fairness of a
remedy that compensates the artist without having to compensate the manager
seems questionable).
9. See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 857 (noting the severe damage to a personal
manager from what may constitute nothing more than an “administrative oversight”).
10. See Marathon, 174 P.3d at 752; cf. Tracie Parry-Bowers, Note, The Talent
Agencies Act: A Call for Reform, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 431, 447 (2007) (discussing the California Court of Appeal’s decision, which Marathon affirmed).
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common-sense approach, and this opinion will only continue to open
the door to problems in the future.11
This article will review the Act’s important provisions and the
precedent that shaped its administration. Next, this article will address the problems with the Act itself and how it violates basic
common law contract principles. Finally, this article will suggest
solutions for the Marathon court and the Act itself.
II. IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE TALENT AGENCIES ACT
The Act requires anyone who “engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or
engagements for an artist or artists” 12 to be registered with the State
of California as a talent agent.13 To become a licensed talent agent,
one must submit two sets of fingerprints and affidavits of at least
two reputable residents stating that “the applicant is a person of good
moral character, or in the case of a corporation, has a reputation for
fair dealing.”14 The applicant must then submit $25015 and deposit a
surety bond in the penal sum of $50,000 payable to the people of the
State of California.16
The Act provides a variety of protections for artists. Talent
agents must submit form contracts that the Labor Commissioner
must approve.17 The Labor Commissioner looks for any language
that is “unfair, unjust and oppressive to the artist.”18 Though not
expressly stated in the statute, unions typically restrict talent agents’
commissions to a maximum commission percentage,19 while per11. See Flores, supra note 4, at 1354–56 (discussing problems resulting from
Blasi and various potential solutions).
12. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
13. Id. § 1700.5.
14. Id. § 1700.6.
15. Id. § 1700.12.
16. Id. §§ 1700.15–.16.
17. Id.
18. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23.
19. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 842; David Zelenski, Note, Talent Agents, Personal Managers, and Their Conflicts in the New Hollywood, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
979, 989–90 (2003).
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sonal managers’ commissions, which are not subject to the Act, are
not subject to these union restrictions.20
III. PRECEDENT THAT SHAPED THE ACT PRIOR TO MARATHON
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. V. BLASI
Prior to the landmark Marathon decision, cases involving the
Act typically voided the entire contract with the personal manager
and required the personal manager to return all proceeds from the
contract.21 Despite the fact that the Act uses the language “engages
in the occupation of procuring,” the courts have found that any
booking, incidental or not, is considered a violation of the Act.22
The courts have not, in any way, differentiated between full-time
work as a talent agent versus the single procurement of a show for an
aspiring artist by an unlicensed personal manager.23
In Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.,24 Waisbren, the
personal manager, sued when he was not paid commissions according to the contract with Peppercorn.25 Peppercorn’s sole defense
was that Waisbren procured employment for Peppercorn without
being a licensed talent agent.26 Even though the court noted the
“catch-22” with the need for personal managers to procure employment in the absence of talent agents, the court shied away from this
quandary and held for Peppercorn, voiding the contract.27

20. See Heath B. Zarin, Note, The California Controversy over Procuring Employment: A Case for the Personal Managers Act, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 927, 941 (1997); Zelenski, supra note 19, at 991 (noting that
while private franchise agreements regulate agents’ activities, the agreements do
not regulate managers’ activities).
21. See, e.g., Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Flores, supra note 4, at 1347 (discussing prior cases which demonstrate that courts
have been unwilling to apply severability to any contracts that violated the Act).
22. Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 747–48 (Cal. 2008) (emphasis
added).
23. Id. at 748.
24. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1995).
25. Id. at 439.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 441, 446–47.
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The court further relied on the California Entertainment Commission’s (“the Commission”) report on the Act in which the Commission proposed the continued prohibition of any procurement, incidental or otherwise, by an unlicensed individual.28 The legislature
fully adopted these proposals and endorsed the Commission’s findings, which the Waisbren court found especially important.29 The
Commission’s report even tackled New York’s equivalent of the
Act, which exempts persons where their “business only incidentally
involves the seeking of employment [for artists].”30 The Commission, and subsequently the legislature, found this provision to be
unworkable and expressly declined to extend the incidental booking
exception to personal managers.31
The Waisbren court declared the disputed contract void as an illegal contract as the penalty for even a single act of procurement in
violation of the Act.32 The court stood on the policy that an illegal
contract cannot be enforced.33 In balancing the unjust enrichment to
Peppercorn against the procurement activities of Waisbren, the court
found that the balance weighed in favor of Peppercorn and deterring
illegal conduct.34 Therefore, Waisbren was not entitled to any of the
unpaid commissions.35
IV. THE MARATHON COURT’S SHORTCOMINGS
Marathon stands as the landmark and most recent case regarding
the Act. The California Supreme Court’s recent decision created
some hope for personal managers by allowing the severance of illegal parts of a contract while preserving valid parts.36 Unfortunately,
the court did not force the Labor Commissioner to apply the doctrine
28. Id. at 444–45.
29. Id.
30. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 2004) (emphasis added).
31. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.
32. Id. at 447.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 751 (Cal. 2008) (applying
the doctrine of severability to the Act).
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of severability to every contract.37 Further, the court gave deference
to the legislature’s wishes that incidental procurement still be considered a violation of the Act.38
In this case, Marathon Entertainment, the defendant’s personal
manager, sued Rosa Blasi because she did not pay the contractually
defined 15 percent of earnings from entertainment employment.39
Marathon claimed it “provided Blasi with lawful personal manager
services by providing the down payment on her house, paying the
salary of her business manager, providing her with professional and
personal advice, and paying her travel expenses.”40
The employment in question was Blasi’s role in the television series Strong Medicine.41 Blasi had reduced Marathon’s commission
from 15 percent to 10 percent, and then later sought to replace Marathon with her talent agent.42 Blasi defended the suit by filing a petition with the Labor Commissioner to declare that Marathon had violated the Act by illegally procuring employment without a license.43
The Labor Commission agreed, voiding the contract ab initio and
barring Marathon from any recovery.44 The trial court affirmed the
Labor Commissioner’s ruling, but the court of appeal reversed in
part, holding that severability was an option because Blasi had not
established that Marathon wrongfully procured her a role in Strong
Medicine.45
On the heels of the court of appeal’s ruling, the California Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the court of appeal’s ruling
with some guidance.46 First, it agreed with the court of appeal that
the Act “regulates conduct, not labels; it is the act of procuring (or
soliciting), not the title of one’s business, that qualifies one as a talent agency and subjects one to the Act’s licensure and related re37. See Parry-Bowers, supra note 10, at 448 (transcribing the Labor Commissioner’s opposition to the lower court’s decision).
38. Marathon, 174 P.3d at 748.
39. Id. at 744.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Marathon, 174 P.3d at 744.
45. Id. at 745.
46. Id. at 744–45.
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quirements.”47 The court applied the Act to any personal manager or
talent agent who procures employment, regardless of their title.48
This closed the loophole left open by other decisions. Personal managers had argued that because they were not mentioned in the Act,
they were not subject to its limitations.49 The court declined to recognize such a distinction and instead focused on the conduct, even
incidental conduct, of procurement and the mandatory requirement
for licensing.50
The California Supreme Court did, however, give some hope to
personal managers. It used the California Civil Code section covering severability to allow valid parts of the contract to stay intact
when it is possible to separate the illegal conduct from the legal conduct.51 Even though the Labor Commissioner had not expressly
cited this section, the court relied on numerous other occasions
where the Labor Commissioner severed contracts and allowed managers to retain or seek commissions based on severability principles.52 The court further relied on a wide range of cases that allowed
severability for contracts involving unlicensed services.53 The court
stopped short of making severability mandatory and simply made it
available to the Labor Commissioner “in order to avoid an inequitable windfall or preserve a contractual relationship where doing so
would not condone illegality.”54 The court explained by stating, “the
fact [that] this remedy is often, or even almost always, appropriate,
does not support the position that it is always proper.”55 Further,
“full voiding of the parties’ contract is available, but not mandatory;
likewise, severance is available, but not mandatory.”56
As guidance, the court explained that to determine whether a
contract clause is severable, courts must consider the “central pur47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 747 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West 2003)).
Id.
Id.
Marathon, 174 P.3d at 747.
Id. at 750–51 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1599 (West 1982)).
Id. at 751.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id. at 754.
Marathon, 174 P.3d at 754.
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pose” of a contract.57 If the court determines that the parties intended to engage in substantial procurement activities that are inseparable from managerial services, then the court may void the entire contract.58 However, an isolated instance of procurement does
not automatically bar recovery for services that could lawfully be
provided without a license, such as the loans, travel expenses, and
salary of Blasi’s business manager.59
For a Labor Commissioner drawn to fairness rather than administrative efficiency, this language may have been enough to give a
fair shot to personal managers in these disputes.60 However, the Labor Commissioner responsible for the Marathon decision, Robert A.
Jones, showed his predisposition against severability in a letter to
Chief Justice Ronald George.61 Between the time of the court of
appeal’s ruling and the California Supreme Court’s decision on
whether to hear the case, Jones wrote to the Chief Justice urging him
to de-publish the ruling so that he was not bound to the policy of
severability.62 In the letter, Jones wrote:
It is anticipated that if the decision in Marathon Entertainment remains published and controlling, the Talent Agent
Controversies hearings will be more complicated and time
consuming in that the issues surrounding the severability of
the contract will have to be addressed and the determination
of whether the illegal procurement activity tainted the entire
contract now before us. . . . The other anticipated result is
that the ability of the Act to regulate unlicensed talent agents
will be greatly eroded.63
With the Labor Commissioner himself showing the predisposition against severability, the Marathon court’s ruling will likely have
57. Id. at 755.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Parry-Bowers, supra note 10, at 449 (reiterating the Labor Commissioner’s history of construing the Act harshly against personal managers).
61. Dave McNary, Commissioner Backs Blasi, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 29, 2006,
at 4, available at http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117949194.html.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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little effect in promoting the use of severability.64 “If the Commissioner feels that the ‘taint of illegality so permeates the entire agreement that it cannot be removed by severance,’ he may still invalidate
the entire agreement.”65 Given that the Commissioner has historically been harsh to personal managers, it is quite likely the Marathon
ruling will carry no additional weight.66 In the past, even though the
Commissioner has the ability to award the personal manager some
compensation, he has typically invalidated the whole contract—
leaving the manager with nothing.67 As there has been no strong
language from the courts that forces the Commissioner to sever contracts, the great likelihood is that he will continue business as usual
and invalidate future contracts ab initio.68
Additionally, personal managers cannot escape the grasp of the
Labor Commissioner. The TAA requires an initial administrative
filing with the Commissioner, giving him exclusive original jurisdiction on any TAA matter.69 Disputes must be heard by the Commissioner and all administrative remedies must be exhausted before the
parties can proceed to superior court.70 Thus, even if the Commissioner is predisposed against severing contracts, personal managers
must still go through this administrative process to determine the
contract’s validity under the TAA.71
In denying Blasi’s summary judgment, the court found sufficient
reasoning to allow severability in the contract, as evidence was not
established that Marathon obtained Blasi’s role in Strong Medicine
in violation of the Act.72 While the court correctly stated the doctrine of severability, it gave the Labor Commissioner, who histori64. See Parry-Bowers, supra note 10, at 449 (“[I]t seems likely that the Commissioner would have little difficulty deciding that any procurement activity in violation of the Act taints the entire contract so as to make it un-severable.”).
65. Id. at 448 (quoting Marathon v. Blasi, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 164 (Ct. App.
2006)).
66. Id. at 449.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (West 2003).
70. Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 710, 729 (Ct. App. 2009).
71. See id. (noting the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies).
72. See Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 755 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting
both of the artist’s arguments and holding that severability was viable in this case).
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cally has been predisposed to favoring agents, the option to invalidate contracts.73 Thus, the court created a rule without any teeth. If
the court had truly wanted to sway the Commissioner away from
voiding personal manager contracts ab initio, it would have used
stronger language and placed a burden on the Commissioner to
prove severability was improbable or outweighed the equitable concerns.74
V. ISSUES WITH THE ACT
While the Act specifically identifies the roles and interactions of
a talent agent and artist,75 it never specifically mentions personal
managers. The only veiled reference to a personal manager is an
exception in the definition of “talent agency” stating that “the activities of procuring, offering, or promising to procure recording contracts for an artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or corporation to regulation and licensing.”76 The express language exempts only procurement for the purpose of obtaining recording contracts; “negotiation of contracts for live performances, merchandising, or concert tours” is not excluded and still requires a license.77
The Act also allows procurement activities by unlicensed individuals when done in “conjunction with” and “at the request of” licensed talent agents.78 On its face, this would seem to provide a
“safe harbor” for personal managers who work hand-in-hand with
licensed talent agents.79 However, the exclusion only becomes effective if the agents are willing to cooperate and validate the lawful
73. See Parry-Bowers, supra note 10, at 449 (noting that forcing the Commissioner to consider severability offers no guarantees, especially with a Commissioner who continues to side with artists and agents).
74. Cf. id. at 448 (weighing the Commissioner’s concerns of complications and
time consumption against obtaining a fair and equitable result).
75. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.23–.47 (West 2003).
76. Id. § 1700.4.
77. James M. O’Brien III, Comment, Regulation of Attorneys Under California’s
Talent Agencies Act: A Tautological Approach to Protecting Artists, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 471, 500 (1992).
78. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d).
79. See O’Brien, supra note 77, at 500.
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participation by providing a confirmation letter.80 In many cases,
however, it is the policy of the talent agency not to provide such letters, thereby negating the idea of a safe harbor.81 This issue is exacerbated when the talent agent wants to double as the artist’s personal
manager, as was the case in Marathon.82
Chief among the flaws of the Act is its failure to define “procurement,” which has led to inconsistent interpretations by the Labor
Commissioner and courts, creating an environment where no one is
quite sure what is allowed.83 The ambiguity leaves unlicensed personal managers unfairly exposed to staggering potential liability.84
The Labor Commissioner, the individual responsible for determining
violations of the Act, and the courts have found the following activities by unlicensed practitioners to be unlawful procurement: “introducing artists to producers or directors, initiating contacts with employers, furthering an offer for an artist-client, and negotiating employment contracts.”85
The definition of procurement gets even murkier when a personal manager puts on a showcase86 for an artist in order to procure a
recording contract. In Park v. Deftones, Park, a personal manager,
argued that his actions in procuring eighty-four showcases for the
Deftones were excepted from the Act’s licensing requirements because he procured the showcases for the purpose of obtaining a recording contract.87 Emphasizing the definition of a talent agency in
the Act, the court found that the exception for talent agents who procure a recording contract did not apply to Park because he was a not
a talent agent but a personal manager, who was not covered by the

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 744 (Cal. 2008).
83. Flores, supra note 4, at 1341–42; O’Brien, supra note 77, at 497–99.
84. Cf. O’Brien, supra note 77, at 497–99 (discussing the effect of the lack of a
definition on attorneys).
85. Id. at 498.
86. A showcase is a live performance by an artist intended to increase the artist’s
publicity and possibly secure a recording contract. Hinds v. Leve, No. TAC 1800, at 3 n.2 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r July 13, 2001), http://www.dir.ca.gov
/dlse/TAC/18-00.pdf.
87. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 616, 617–18 (Ct. App. 1999).
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Act.88 However, in Hinds v. Leve, the Labor Commissioner held that
because Hinds’ manager succeeded in procuring the recording contract, the manager’s activity could be distinguished from that of the
manager in Park.89
The question thus becomes how many showcases constitute a
violation of the Act. While it is probably more than one, but certainly less than eighty, courts have provided no guidance that would
help personal managers work within the Act and avoid the risk of
losing all commissions.90 Further, the Labor Commissioner seems to
allow personal managers to hold showcases only where they succeed
in obtaining a recording contract, so an unlucky night at a showcase
may quickly become illegal procurement.91
Without an incidental booking exception that is equivalent to the
New York law,92 and with a broad-sweeping interpretation of procurement, a personal manager is constantly put in awkward positions
as he goes about his work.93 At a cocktail party, a personal manager
would essentially either have to avoid the topic of work or immediately excuse himself if a producer or executive discusses a client’s
work, for such discussion may be perceived as attempting to procure
employment.94 This problem illustrates that the expansive interpretation of the Act, without an incidental booking exception fails to
protect the artist at all, which is the original purpose of the Act.95
Additionally, while the Act protects licensed talent agents from
children disavowing contracts, it does not protect personal managers
88. Id. at 618.
89. No. TAC 18-00, at 6–7 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r July 13, 2001),
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/18-00.pdf.
90. But see Park, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619 (noting that even incidental procurement is regulated by the Act).
91. Compare id. at 617 (finding illegality when procurement was unsuccessful),
with Hinds, No. TAC 18-00, at 8–9 (finding no illegality when procurement was
successful).
92. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 2004).
93. See generally Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 743 (Cal. 2008)
(explaining the realistic catch-22 of artists who are not established enough to get
themselves a talent agent needing to hire personal managers to promote their careers).
94. See Flores, supra note 4, at 1335–37 (providing a hypothetical fact pattern
resulting in the Labor Commissioner voiding the contract pre-Marathon).
95. See Marathon, 174 P.3d at 756.
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from knowing, responsible adults effectively doing exactly the same
thing.96 Generally, and in California’s Family Code, a minor can
disavow a contract prior to reaching majority or within a reasonable
time thereafter, unless barred by statute.97 Minors are permitted to
disavow contracts because, in the eyes of the law, minors lack the
judgment and experience to adequately and fairly contract in their
best interests.98 In general, a person contracting with a minor does
so at his own peril.99 The Act, however, specifically denies minors
the privilege of disavowing an otherwise valid contract when it has
been approved by the superior court.100 Thus, a talent agent contracting with a child is no longer doing so at his own peril, but rather
has the protection of the Act behind him. The Act prohibits minors
from disavowing talent contracts because talent agents need to rely
on the assurance that their time and hard work cannot be tossed aside
simply because the client is a minor.101 However, the Act provides
no protection for personal managers in their contracts with artists,
either minors or adults.
Finally, even if personal managers wanted to become licensed as
talent agents to procure employment legally, it would invalidate the
rest of their business model and cap their commission at 10 percent
because they would come under union control.102 Though it is not a
requirement to be a part of a union, talent agents become franchised
96. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.37 (West 2003).
97. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6710 (West 2004).
98. Sparks v. Sparks, 225 P.2d 238, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (“The law shields
minors from their lack of judgment and experience and confers upon them the
right to avoid their contracts in order that they may be protected against their own
improvidence and the designs and machinations of other people, thus discouraging
adults from contracting with them.”).
99. Id.
100. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.37.
101. See Thom Hardin, Note, The Regulation of Minors’ Entertainment Contracts: Effective California Law or Hollywood Grandeur?, 19 J. JUV. L. 376, 378
(1998) (“[A] studio may invest substantial money in these projects because it is
relying on a minor to fulfill his or her contractual obligations. If a minor disaffirms his or her contract with a motion pictures studio, the studio may lose its
competitive edge as well as its project investments.”).
102. See Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 745 (Cal. 2008); Zelenski,
supra note 19, at 989 (discussing the mechanism through which the unions enforce
their standards).
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through unions based on a mutual understanding among union members not to use non-union members.103 The unions further require
shorter contract durations and bar producing the artist’s work and
obtaining a producer’s fee—all standard parts of a personal manager’s contract with an artist.104 This type of “catch-22” situation is
precisely what personal managers face every day while working for
their clients’ best interests.105
VI. ADDING SENSE TO THE TAA
The Act106 has progressed far past protection for artists and into a
law with no basis in business or market realities. In bringing the Act
back to reality, a number of simple principles can be implemented to
bring fairness to personal managers who take a great deal of risk in
emerging artists, only to be hurt by an incidental violation of the Act,
especially when that violation, the procurement of the employment,
aids the artist.
The first change is obvious: allow incidental booking as the
equivalent New York law does.107 The fear, as stated in Waisbren, is
that “incidental” is an unworkable standard and would undermine
the purpose of the Act.108 However, “New York has experienced no
major problems with its incidental booking exception . . . nor has the
entertainment industry in New York fallen apart as a result” of having this exception.109 Allowing these few instances of procurement
by personal managers would avoid the hazard of “punish[ing] most
severely those managers who work hardest and advocate most successfully for their clients, allowing the clients to establish them103. See Zelenski, supra note 19, at 989.
104. See Marathon, 174 P.3d at 745–46.
105. See id. at 743 (explaining the complex realities of procuring employment for
new artists while still trying to remain within the bounds of the Act).
106. The Act was enacted in 1913 and was later codified into its current form in
1978. Talent Agencies Act, ch. 282, 1913 Cal. Stat. 519 (codified as amended at
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700–1700.47 (2003 & Supp. 2010)).
107. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 2004).
108. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 442 (Ct. App.
1995).
109. O’Brien, supra note 77, at 509.
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selves, make themselves marketable to licensed talent agencies, and
be in a position to turn and renege on commissions,” as the Marathon court lamented prior to noting that they have no authority to
rewrite the law to include such an exception.110
Second, the legislature should allow personal managers to pay a
proactive per employment fee instead of requiring that personal
managers become a fully-licensed talent agent. This allows for the
business reality of procuring employment, especially prior to establishing the artists at a level for which a talent agent would be interested. By allowing this fee, the state would generate income and
could restrict any booking commission to the union’s standard 10
percent. Additionally, this fee would still allow the personal managers to collect the higher fees for other aspects of their management
such as counseling, advising, taking care of business arrangements,
and charting the course of an artist’s career.111
With this change, personal managers will no longer have to fear
that their clients will refuse to pay commissions, or that the Labor
Commissioner will void the entire contract. The fee itself could be
sizable enough to discourage personal managers from making a habit
out of procuring employment. More importantly, it would be a
guarantee that the artist could not later come back and invalidate the
contract on illegal procurement grounds.
Third, the procurement of employment without a license should
not be allowed as a defense in a suit seeking commissions by the
personal manager for employment procurement that occurred more
than a year prior to the suit. Rather than looking for ways to protect
personal managers, the courts continue to be lenient when artists use
the TAA as a defense. In Styne v. Stevens, the court ruled that statute of limitations does not limit this defensive use.112 The Styne
court differentiated defensive uses of the TAA by saying that
“[s]tatutes of limitations bar ‘actions or proceedings,’ thus guarding
against stale claims.”113 Though Styne involved multiple instances
of procurement, the court’s interpretation allows an artist to keep
110.
111.
112.
113.

Marathon, 174 P.3d at 756.
See id. at 745–46.
26 P.3d 343, 351 (Cal. 2001).
Id. at 350 (citation omitted).
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even a single instance of procurement in his back pocket to void a
contract ab initio if the personal manager later files suit.
This defense should only be allowed if the action occurred within
one year from the date of the filing of the suit. Otherwise, a single
instance of procurement, which is done purely to help the artist
achieve success, immediately and permanently makes the contract
voidable by the artist.114 The personal manager’s only hope, and not
a strong one with the current Labor Commissioner, is severability of
non-illegal purposes.115
Finally, the court should, in some cases, enforce the illegal contract. Where a contract is prohibited merely for the protection of a
class of persons, as the artists in the Act, the court may award remedies through quantum meruit or quantum valebat.116 In instances
where the artist both received and appreciated the procurement of
employment in order to become successful:
[S]ound public policy may demand either the enforcement of
an executory illegal agreement . . . such as when a denial of
such relief by the courts would . . . result in harm to those for
whose protection such agreements are declared illegal. Thus,
in some cases, public policy is best served by rescission or
enforcement of the agreement, even though the result is to
permit recovery by a guilty plaintiff . . . .117
The Act has resulted in unjust enrichment to artists while harming personal managers. Artists are, on one hand, gaining a benefit
from the procurement activities of their personal manager while, at
the same time, holding these incidents of procurement in their back

114. See Marathon, 174 P.3d at 748 (holding that a single act of procurement can
violate the Act).
115. Severability applies only “when the parties have contracted, in part, for
something illegal. Notwithstanding any such illegality, it preserves and enforces
any lawful portion of a parties’ contract that feasibly may be severed.” Id. at 750–
51. Severability allows the personal manager to be compensated for any services
provided which do not violate any laws, such as paying an artist’s rent or providing loans as artists struggle to break into the industry. See id.
116. 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 19:76 (4th ed. 1998).
117. Id. § 19:75 (footnotes omitted).
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pockets in case a problem ever arises.118 A personal manager’s procurement for his client helps everyone involved and hurts no one: the
artist gains notoriety and gets compensation for his work; the personal manager gets notoriety for his client which improves the likelihood of his client’s success; and a talent agent who is uninvolved
in the procurement gains a potential client because the artist could
potentially gain enough notoriety to be worthy of a talent contract.119
In fact, the talent agent only stands to gain from the personal
manager procuring employment; the talent agent would not have
gotten the commission for procurement because the artists for whom
personal managers work typically are not established enough to
make it worth a talent agent’s time.120 Despite the benefits that a
personal manager confers on the artist and the unknowing talent
agent, it is only the personal manager who stands to suffer if the artist brings a claim under the Act.
VII. CONCLUSION
Personal managers take a staggering amount of risk when they
represent new artists.121 They take a greater degree of involvement
by lending money to young artists, and serving as spokespersons and
sometimes as business managers.122 Even with all of the hard work,
personal managers risk their entire contract being invalidated for
procuring employment by doing exactly what the artists want—
making them a success.123
While normally progressive, the California courts and legislature
continue to take an approach with the Talent Agencies Act that disregards the business and market realities of a personal manager’s
interaction with an artist. Rather than allow the invalidation of an
entire contract at the hands of a predisposed Labor Commissioner,
118. See, e.g., Styne, 26 P.3d at 351.
119. See Flores, supra note 4, at 1335–36.
120. See id. at 1335.
121. Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 745–46 (Cal. 2008).
122. Id.
123. See generally id. at 743 (explaining the realistic catch-22 of artists who are
not established enough to get talent agents and who need to hire personal managers to promote their careers).
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the courts must be stronger in their language and directives, and the
legislature must step up and create an incidental booking exception.
Further, the courts must apply basic contract principles and prohibit
the use of procurement as a defense outside of a statute of limitations. Without these basic principles, fewer artists may be discovered due to personal managers’ fears that they will have a contract
voided.124 In order to truly protect artists, as the aim of the Act
claims to be, the courts and legislature must protect the personal
managers so they feel secure finding and promoting the next needle
in a haystack.

124. See id.

